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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing unease in space, and on Earth.1 Fueled by rising geopolitical tensions on Earth2 and growing rhetoric on the inevitability of a war
in space,3 humanity stands at a crucial turning point and a crossroads: Do we
continue to collectively reap the economic, technological, scientific, social,
and strategic benefits that space activities and assets have to offer,4 or do we
choose to weaponize the “ultimate high ground”5 and direct space assets as
instruments of destruction in ways unimaginable?6

1

As the U.S. Representative to the First Committee of the General Assembly succinctly
argued in 1962:
Outer space is not a new subject, it is just a new place in which all the
old subjects come up. The things that go on in space are intimately related
to the things that go on here on earth. It would be naive to suppose that
we can insulate outer space from other aspects of human existence.
See Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 57 AM. J.
OF INT’L L. 403, 429 (1963).
2
Among which are tensions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, the unilateral
withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (2002) and more recently the events in
Syria and ongoing trade war between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.
3
Stuart Clark, It’s Going to Happen: Is the World Ready for a War in Space?,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2018), www.theguardian.com/science/2018/apr/15/its-going-to-happ
en-is-world-ready-for-war-in-space; see also Steven Freeland, Star Wars: The Battle for
Laws Against War in Outer Space, AUSTL. INST. INT’L AFF. (Apr. 4, 2018), http://www.inte
rnationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/star-wars-law-in-outer-space/.
4
See Benefits of Space for Humankind, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE
AFF., https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/benefits-of-space/benefits.html (last visited Feb.
22, 2020); see generally Jeff Greenblatt & Al Anzaldua, How Space Technology Benefits
the Earth, SPACE REV. (July 29, 2019), https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3768/1.
5
After the launch of Sputnik, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas D. White
was quoted as saying “I feel that in the future whoever has the capability to control space
will likewise possess the capability to control the surface of the Earth.” ROBERT F.
FUTRELL, IDEAS, CONCEPTS, DOCTRINE: BASIC THINKING IN THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
550 (1989). Fast forward to 2019, United States President Trump noted that there are those
who “seek to challenge [the U.S.] in the ultimate high ground of space.” Remarks by President Trump at Event Establishing the U.S. Space Command, WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 29,
2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-eventestablishing-u-s-space-command/.
6
Writing already in the early 1980s, Bhupendra Jasani warned that: “The militarization
of outer space has reached such a level that loss of some or all of a nation’s military spacecraft would reduce considerably the efficiency of that nation’s fighting forces on Earth.
Therefore war in space would be just an indication of initiation of a war on Earth . . . .”
See BHUPENDRA JASANI, SPACE: BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE 444 (1982). A space war
“could very well end with a crippled global economy, inoperable infrastructure, and a
planet shrouded by the orbiting fragments of pulverized satellites” Garrett M. Graff, The
New Arms Race Threatening to Explode in Space, WIRED (June 26, 2018), https://www.wir
ed.com/story/new-arms-race-threatening-to-explode-in-space/.
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Space systems perform a myriad of civilian weather monitoring, communications, navigation, and facilitate the provision of humanitarian and emergency relief efforts.7 The sustainable and responsible use of space is, however,
increasingly fragile, threatened by intensified research and potential deployment of a whole host of disabling or destructive ways and means. These range
from electronic warfare (jamming and spoofing of transmissions), cyber-attacks, directed energy attacks (from the ground, air, sea, or space-based platforms), to orbital-based anti-satellite systems, and ground-based anti-satellite
weapons.8
Indeed, high on the agenda at the United Nations (UN) for decades is the
concern of an arms race in outer space,9 and the placement (and arguably use)
of weapons in outer space that would pose a “grave danger for international
peace and security.”10 This Article will provide an overview of adequacy of
the legal framework in securing the responsible and peaceful use of outer
space, and long-standing diplomatic efforts to prevent the extension of arms
into the final frontier. Specifically, it will turn attention to the recently adopted
UN Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines,11 as well as civil society initiatives,
such as the McGill Manual on International Law Applicable to Military Uses
of Outer Space (McGill Manual, or MILAMOS), which aim to increase transparency and strengthen the rule of law in a domain space where scientific,
economic and strategic interest invariably intercept and intertwine.12
II. LEGAL REGIME GOVERNING SPACE
Outer space has never been a lawless domain of human activity, but has
always been subject to international law.13 As soon as activities of states entered the realm of outer space, the overarching regime of international law that
7
Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Humanitarian Consequences and Constraints Under
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) Related to the Potential Use of Weapons in Outer
Space, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. GE-PAROS/2019/WP.1 (Mar. 18, 2019).
8
U.N. Secretary-General, Group of Governmental Experts on Further Practical
Measures for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, ¶ 36, U.N. Doc. A/74/77,
annex II (Apr. 9, 2019).
9
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 74/32, Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (Dec. 12, 2019).
The same resolution has been adopted annually for close to four decades since 1981.
10
G.A. Res. 74/34, Further Practical Measures for the Prevention of an Arms Race in
Outer Space, at pmbl., ¶ 3 (Dec. 12, 2019).
11
Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of Work of Its Sixty-Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/74/20, at 50–69 (July 3, 2019) [hereinafter Long-Term Sustainability
Guidelines].
12
For more information on the MILAMOS Project, please visit the dedicated
MILAMOS website: www.mcgill.ca/milamos/.
13
MANFRED LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY
LAWMAKING 125 (Tanja Masson-Zwaan & Stephan Hobe eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
2010) (1972) [hereinafter LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE] (reissued on the occasion of
the 50th anniversary of the International Institute of Space Law).
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governs the rights and responsibilities of states became automatically applicable.14 These sentiments are reflected in the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space,15 and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,16 which translated the provisions
of the 1963 Declaration into a binding multilateral agreement. Article III of
the Outer Space Treaty underlines that:
States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding.17
That space activities must be conducted in the interest of international
peace and security traces its origins to the dawn of the Space Age. In 1958,
almost immediately after the launch of the first artificial satellite Sputnik I,
the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the first resolution specifically
dealing with outer space.18 Recognizing that all humankind, have a “common
interest” in outer space,19 the Preamble of Resolution 1348 (XIII) underlined
the importance of avoiding “the extension of present national rivalries into
this new field.”20 To further “co-operation in the study of outer space for
peaceful purposes,”21 the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(UNCOPUOS)22 was established as the diplomatic forum to address and adopt
14
Id. Even before the space era, Oscar Schachter argued that legal principles and precedents which form customary international law are applicable to space activities. Oscar
Schachter, Who Owns the Universe, in SPACE LAW: A SYMPOSIUM PREPARED AT THE
REQUEST OF HONORABLE LYNDON B. JOHNSON 8, 14 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office 1959).
15
G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), Declaration of Legal Principles Concerning the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, ¶¶ 2, 4 (Dec. 13, 1963) [hereinafter
Declaration of Legal Principles].
16
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
17
Declaration of Legal Principles, supra note 15, at ¶ 4; and Outer Space Treaty, supra
note 16, at art III.
18
G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), Question of the Peaceful Use of Outer Space (Dec. 13, 1958).
The first resolution that incidentally alluded to space activities was adopted immediately
after the launching of Sputnik I, and called for the “joint study of an inspection system
designed to ensure that the sending of objects through outer space shall be exclusively for
peaceful and scientific purposes.” See G.A. Res.1148 (XII), ¶ 1(f) (Nov. 14, 1957) (emphasis added).
19
G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), supra note 18, at pmbl., ¶ 1.
20
Id. at pmbl., ¶ 1.
21
Id. at pmbl., ¶ 7.
22
Id. at ¶ 1.
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measures relating to the peaceful use of outer space.23 In the years that followed, several treaties24 and resolutions25 adopted by the UNCOPUOS would
form a body of rules underpinning the global space governance system.26
The unanimously-adopted 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles resolution
and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty both recognize in their respective preambles27 “the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration
and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.”28 The concept of “peaceful
23

At the time of writing, the UNCOPUOS has grown to assume the role “as a forum for
fostering dialogue and cooperation among States members of the Committee and organizations with permanent observer status and for strengthening partnerships among States,
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, industry and private sector entities.” The number of Members States of the Committee has increased from eighteen in
1958 to ninety-two Member States in 2019. See Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 15–16.
24
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968,
19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 (entered into force Dec. 3, 1968) [hereinafter Rescue
and Return Agreement]; Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects, Mar 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force Sept.
1, 1972) [hereinafter Liability Convention]: Convention on Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Nov. 12, 1974, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023
U.N.T.S. 15 (entered into force Sept. 15, 1976) [hereinafter Registration Convention];
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 11, 1984) [hereinafter Moon Agreement].
25
They are: Declaration of Legal Principles, supra note 15; G.A. Res. 37/92, Principles
Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting (Dec. 10, 1982); G.A. Res. 41/65, Principles Relating to Remote Sensing
of the Earth from Space (Dec. 3, 1986); G.A. Res. 47/68, Principles Relevant to the Use of
Nuclear Sources in Outer Space (Dec. 14, 1992); G.A. Res. 51/122, Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the
Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries
(Dec. 13, 1996) [hereinafter Space Benefits Declaration].
26
See RAM JAKHU & JOSEPH PELTON, GLOBAL SPACE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL
STUDY (2017); see also G.A. Dec. 2/33, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/116 (Dec. 13, 2017).
27
This does raise the issue of whether text in the preamble of an international instrument
can have binding force. In South West Africa Cases, the ICJ held:
[T]he preambular parts of the United Nations Charter constitute the
moral and political basis for the specific legal provisions thereafter set
out. Such considerations do not, however, in themselves amount to rules
of law. All States are interested—have an interest—in such matters. But
the existence of an “interest” does not of itself entail that this interest is
specifically juridical in character.
See South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Judgement, 1966 I.C.J. 6,
¶ 50 (July 18). Even so, the preamble has an important role in the interpretation of treaties.
See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S
331 [hereinafter Convention on the Law of Treaties or VCLT].
28
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16, at ¶ 2. Note that the Preamble of Resolution 1348
(XIII) underlined “the common aim that outer space should be used for peaceful purposes
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purpose” does not have an authoritative definition and continues to be a source
of contention.29 What evolved from declarations of spacefaring states and
state practice, particularly of the former Soviet Union and the United States,30
is that “peaceful purposes” means that outer space can be used both for civilian and military non-aggressive purposes.31 Thus, as long as space activities,
including those conducted by the military or are in support of a strategic or
military activities, are carried out in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter, then it is compatible with exploring or using space
for “peaceful purposes.”32

only.” G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), supra note 18, at pmbl., ¶ 1 (emphasis added); see also id. at
pmbl., ¶ 10 (reflecting text of the Antarctic Treaty, which drafted and adopted around the
same time as the UN resolutions on space were adopted). Thus, Article 1 of the Antarctic
Treaty reads:
1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be
prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.
2. The present treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel or
equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes.
Antarctic Treaty art. 1, June 23, 1961, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (emphasis added). The immediate
recognition of outer space as an ultimate high ground for military operations would eventually weaken the notion that outer space should be explored and used for “peaceful purposes only. See Bin Cheng, Military Use of Outer Space: Article IV of the 1967 Space
Treaty Revisited, in THE UTILIZATION OF THE WORLD’S AIR SPACE AND FREE OUTER SPACE
AND FREE OUTER SPACE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 305, 308 (Chia-Jui Cheng & Doo Hwan Kim
eds., 2000).
29
See, e.g., Marko G. Markoff, Disarmament and “Peaceful Purposes” Provisions in
the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, 4 J. SPACE L. 3 (1976); CARL Q. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 20–25 (Pergamon Press 1982); Ivan A. Vlasic, The
Legal Aspects of Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, in PEACEFUL AND NONPEACEFUL USES OF SPACE: PROBS. OF DEFINITION FOR THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE
37 (Bhupendra Jasani ed., 1991); Bin Cheng, Definitional Issues in Space Law: The
‘Peaceful Use’ of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, in STUDIES
IN INT’L SPACE LAW 281 (1997); Elizabeth S. Waldrop, Weaponization of Outer Space: US
National Policy, 29 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 329 (2004).
Though, Judge Manfred Lachs notes “there seems to be little doubt as to the real
meaning of [the] words” peaceful purposes, which purport to completely disarm and demilitarise space. LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, supra note 13, at 97.
30
Cheng, supra note 29, at 224–25; see also Vladimir Kopal, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.N. AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. OF INT’L L. 1 (2008), https://leg
al.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/tos/tos_e.pdf.
31
This has been the position of the majority of States. See Carl Q. Christol, The Common
Interest in the Exploration, Use and Exploitation of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes:
The Soviet-American Dilemma, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH COLLOQUIUM
ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE (1985).
32
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16, at art. III.
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This understanding can be further supported by Article IV of the Outer
Space Treaty, which provides that the Moon and other celestial bodies must
be explored and used for “exclusively” peaceful purposes.33 The inclusion of
the word “exclusive” is clarified as meaning an express prohibition of the “establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications,” and an unambiguous prohibition against “the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies.” 34 Nevertheless, military
personnel, equipment, and facilities can be used for scientific research or for
“peaceful exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies.”35
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty specifically prohibits states parties
from placing “in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons
or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction” and from installing “such
weapons on celestial bodies, or station[ing] such weapons in outer space in
any other manner.”36 This prohibition does not forbid the placement or stationing of conventional, non-nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction.37
In effect, the Outer Space Treaty does not expressly prohibit military uses
of outer space per se, and only partially de-weaponizes it in relation to nuclear
weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, thousands of space objects
have been, are being, and will no doubt continue to be launched and operated
for military purposes.38 Even a series of anti-satellite (ASAT) tests carried out
by the U.S., Russia, China, and, more recently, India have not been condemned as contrary to the legal framework governing the use of space for
peaceful purposes.39
33

Id. at art IV ¶ 2.
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at ¶ 1.
37
See Setsuko Aoki, Law and Military Uses of Outer Space, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK
OF SPACE LAW 197, 201–02 (Ram S. Jakhu & Paul Stephen Dempsey eds., 2017).
38
See USC Satellite Database, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, www.ucsusa.org/resources/satellite-database (last visited Dec. 16, 2019).
39
Indeed, after the most recent ASAT test in March 2019, the Ministry of External Affairs of India noted that: “India has no intention of entering into an arms race in outer space.
We have always maintained that space must be used only for peaceful purposes. We are
against the weaponization of Outer Space and support international efforts to reinforce the
safety and security of space based assets.” See Frequently Asked Questions on Mission
Shakti, India’s Anti-Satellite Missile Test Conducted on 27 March, 2019, INDIAN MINISTRY
OF EXTERNAL AFF. (Mar. 27, 2019), https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/31179/Frequ
ently+Asked+Questions+on+Mission+Shakti+Indias+AntiSatellite+Missile+test+conduct
ed+on+27+March+2019. Further, the Ministry noted that: “India is not in violation of any
international law or Treaty to which it is a Party or any national obligation.” Id.; see also
Brian Weeden & Victoria Sampson, India’s ASAT Test is Wake-Up Call for Norms of Behavior in Space, SPACE NEWS (Apr. 8, 2019), https://spacenews.com/op-ed-indias-asat-test
-is-wake-up-call-for-norms-of-behavior-in-space/ (“India’s ASAT test is wake-up call for
norms of behavior in space”).
34
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However, unlike under traditional international law—summarized by the
ruling in the Lotus case, stating that what is not expressly prohibited is permitted—this concept is not strictly applicable to the realm of outer space.40
Despite the lack of express prohibition of military uses of space, in the global
commons of outer space, where the shared interests of states prevail over the
individual interests of any one state, the types of activities and actions in space
are limited by, e.g., the rights of other states to explore and use space,41 and
the obligation to conduct activities in outer space “with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty.”42 There is also
the general obligation to conduct space activities “in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding,”43 and the legality of military uses will be assessed
against this criteria.
III. THE LEGAL LACUNAE WITH REGARD TO RESPONSIBLE AND PEACEFUL
USE OF OUTER SPACE
While the space law treaties and other international instruments outline
fundamental principles governing the exploration and use of outer space, to
date there is no comprehensive document that lays down the legal parameters
of the specific types of activities permissible in space. In particular, even
though many space technologies and assets are inherently tied to military and
strategic uses of outer space, there is little guidance or consensus on the extent
to which military space activities are permissible on the spectrum of peacetime and times of armed conflict. Though there is a right to consult and be
consulted whenever the space activities of another State in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space has potential to cause “harmful interreference,”44 there is unfortunately no “precise method . . . for determining, in an
objective way, what constitutes harmful interference . . . .”45

40

S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgement, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18–19 (Sept. 7);
see also V.S. VERESHCHETIN, PREVENTION OF THE ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE:
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECT, at 10–11, UNIDIR/86/08, U.N. Sales No. GV.86.02 (1986);
Jonathan F. Galloway, Nuclear Winter, Ballistic Missile Defense, and the Legal Regime
for Outer Space, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHT COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE, supra note 31, at 23; Ram Jakhu, Legal Issues Relating to the Global Public
Interest in Space Law, 32 J. SPACE L. 31, 41–43 (2006).
41
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16, at art I.
42
Id. at art. IX.
43
Id. at art. III.
44
Id. at art IX.
45
Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Survey of the Problem of Discretion
Exercised by States in Interpreting Basic Legal Principles and Norms Related to Safety and
Security in Outer Space: Working Paper Submitted by the Russian Federation, ¶ 12, U.N.
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Currently, space activities are generally conducted under a legal regime
“shaped largely by unilateral interpretation of general principles combined
with informal rules of the road.”46 Though, to date, states have exercised restraint in outer space and not allowed instances of interference to escalate,
“self-restraint is no substitute for effective governance mechanisms, codified
in international law, especially when tensions are running high.”47 As the Russian Federation recently forewarned: “The very impossibility, due to objective
reasons, to reach the clear definition of a hostile intent, especially as applied
to outer space, may only lead to unprecedented subjectivity in interpretations
and, hence, a dramatic increase in the probability of conflicts.”48
Indeed, in what has been labelled as the highly “congested, contested and
competitive” domain of activities,49 various aspects of space operations can
suffer interference, or be interfered with, whether unintentionally or intentionally. Such interference may be through electromagnetic means, or:
[C]aused as a result of the following: experiments providing
for a considerable alteration of the natural conditions of the
space environment; operations influencing the function of
equipment aboard space objects (for example, blocking or limiting the field of view of on-board optical or radio equipment);
inspection operations which may lead to the threat of collision
of space objects under the jurisdiction and control of different
States; and operations providing for a non-coordinated physical contact of a space object under the jurisdiction and control
of one State with a space object under the jurisdiction and control of another State.50

Doc. A/AC.105/2018/CRP.17 (June 21, 2018) [hereinafter Survey of the Problem of Discretion].
46
Nina Tannenwald, Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a RuleBased Regime for Outer Space, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 363, 378 (2004); see also Survey of
the Problem of Discretion, supra note 45, at ¶ 1.
47
First Comm. of the U.N. G.A. – Disarmament and International Security, Civil Society Statement on Outer Space Security, delivered by Cesar Jaramillo, Project Ploughshares,
(Oct. 16, 2015), http://ploughshares.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/OuterSpace-1stCom2015.pdf.
48
Survey of the Problem of Discretion, supra note 45, at ¶ 20.
49
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, NAT’L SEC. SPACE
STRATEGY: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY 1 (2011), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/News
room/Reports%20and%20Pubs/2011_nationalsecurityspacestrategy.pdf;
see
also
RAJESWARI PILLAI RAJAGOPALAN, PROJECT PLOUGHSARES, OUTER SPACE: CROWDED,
CONGESTED, AND CONTESTED (2018), https://www.ploughshares.ca/pl_publications/outerspace-crowded-congested-and-contested.
50
See Survey of the Problem of Discretion, supra note 45, at ¶ 22; see generally SPACE
SECURITY INDEX 2019 (Jessica West ed., 16th ed. 2019) (providing context and annual
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While harmful interference has been defined in the telecommunications
context as “[i]nterference which endangers the functioning of a radionavigation service or of other safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs or repeatedly interrupts a radiocommunication service,”51 there are no objective
standards as to what can be deemed to constitute endangering the functions of
a space object, or what threshold must be reached to qualify as “seriously”
degrading, obstructing, or repeatedly interrupting communications. Similarly,
with the growing ability to conduct rendezvous and proximity operations
(RPOs), which may be instrumental for debris mitigation operations,52 there
is also unease as to whether such operation may be interpreted as a threat or
use of force.53
IV. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE RESPONSIBLE AND
PEACEFUL USE OF SPACE
Despite commending the Outer Space Treaty for identifying common interests and concerns and capturing them “in a mutually acceptable legal instrument”54 concluded in “remarkably short time,”55 then-U.S. Secretary of
State Dean Rusk noted that “[t]he treaty is not complete in all possible details,” and “does not deal with all problems that may develop.”56
Five decades on, considering the continuing “fragility of the space environment and the challenges to the long-term sustainability of outer space
updates on seventeen indicators of space security); Global Counterspace Capabilities: An
Open Source Assessment (Brian Weeden & Victoria Sampson eds., 2019), swfound.org/me
dia/206408/swf_global_counterspace_april2019_web.pdf (providing assessments of many
national programs related to space defense).
51
Int’l Telecomm. Union [ITU], Radio Regulations, art. 1.169 (2016). States must establish and operate their communications (including through space-based means) in “such
a manner as not to cause harmful interference” of other States. States need only establish
and operate their communications (including through space-based means) in “such a manner as not to cause harmful interference” of other States. Id. at § 0.4; accord Constitution
of the International Telecommunication Union art. 45, Dec. 22, 1992, T.I.A.S. 97-1026,
1825 U.N.T.S. 361.
52
See Writing the Rules on Close-Proximity Orbital Operations, EUROPEAN SPACE
AGENCY (July 8, 2019), blogs.esa.int/cleanspace/2019/07/08/writing-the-rules-on-close-pr
oximity-orbital-operations.
53
See, e.g., Brian Weeden, Dir. of Program Planning, Secure World Found., The Evolution of Space Rendezvous and Proximity Operations and Implications for Space Security,
Presentation at the U.N. Disarmament Conference (Apr. 12, 2019), https://unidir.org/sites/
default/files/2019-12/Brian%20WEEDEN%20 %20UNDCRPOApr2019.pdf.
54
Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th
Cong. 2 (1967) (statement of Hon. Dean Rusk, Sec’y of State); see also id. at 3 (“The
standards developed in the Outer Space Treaty represent a balance of rights and obligations
between nations who are conducting space activities and those who do not.”).
55
Id. at 2.
56
Id. at 4.
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activities,”57 there are obvious gaps “in the binding legal framework on outer
space brought about as a result of the continuous evolution of space technology.”58 Though the space law treaties and resolutions provide a “sound and
basic framework for outer space activities,”59 since the adoption of the Moon
Agreement in 197960 there has been little appetite in the diplomatic arena for
the adoption of a new binding instrument dealing with activities in outer
space.61 In particular, there is a risk of “misperception, misinformation, misunderstanding and miscalculation arising from military activities in outer
space,”62 and as a result “preventing conflicts in outer space and preserving
outer space for peaceful purposes ha[s] become more relevant than ever.”63
Though States have acted with much restraint in outer space and largely
maintained the exploration and use of space for “peaceful purposes,”64 brewing earthly tensions and the “serious legal deficit”65 in concrete instruments
to restrict, let alone prohibit, the weaponization of and/or extension of armed
conflict into outer space may result in a situation where space itself becomes
the very theater of war. The Russian Federation voiced urgent concerns about
unilateral interpretations of “principles and norms of international law pertaining to safety and security in outer space,”66 particularly in a domain where
concepts such as what constitute “harmful interference” are ill-defined and

57

G.A. Res. 73/91, International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, ¶ 8
(Dec. 18, 2018) [hereinafter ICPUOS].
58
Long Term Sustainability Guidelines, supra note 11, at ¶ 199.
59
Id. at ¶ 197.
60
Though the space law treaties and resolutions provide a “sound and basic framework
for outer space activities,” since the adoption of the Moon Agreement in 1979, there has
been little appetite in the diplomatic arena . . . .” See Moon Agreement, supra note 24, at
3.
61
The Moon Agreement was the last treaty dealing with activities in space to be adopted.
See Moon Agreement, supra note 24, at 3. The most recent treaty to be proposed failed to
gain international support. See Letter dated Feb. 12, 2008 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation and the Permanent Representative of China to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference Transmitting
the Russian and Chinese Texts of the Draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT),
U.N. Doc. CD/1839 (Feb. 29, 2008) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. CD/1839 ]; Meetings Coverage, Raising Alarm over Possible Space Wars, First Committee Delegates Explore Ways
to Build New Order for Preventing Celestial Conflict, Confrontation, GA/DIS/3609 (Oct.
24, 2018), https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/gadis3609.doc.htm.
62
Long Term Sustainability Guidelines, supra note 11, at ¶ 49.
63
Id. at ¶ 51.
64
Tannenwald, supra note 46, at 409.
65
Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto & Steven Freeland, From Star Wars to Space Wars—The
Next Strategic Frontier: Paradigms to Anchor Space Security, 33 J. AIR & SPACE L. 10, 36
(2008).
66
Survey of the Problem of Discretion, supra note 45, at ¶ 1.
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may lead to “conflict and near-to-conflict situations in outer space.”67 What is
needed is a better awareness of the nature, positions, and trajectories space
objects and activities in outer space,68 as well as clearer standards and agreed
set of rules on launch, on-orbit operations, and post-mission disposal of space
objects to increase overall transparency, as well as to prevent and diffuse possible escalating tensions in space.69
To date, attempts at addressing the wider issue of military uses of space
and space security have included a U.N. General Assembly resolution aimed
at deterring an arms race in outer space,70 a proposed Sino-Russian treaty
aimed at the prevention of the placement of weapons and prohibiting the threat
or use of force in space,71 the development of transparency and confidencebuilding measures (TCBMs) relating to space activities,72 and attempts to clarify norms of behaviour in space.73 Further, joint ad hoc meetings of the First
(Disarmament and International Security) and Fourth (Special Political and
Decolonization) Committees of the UN General Assembly were convened in
2015 and 2017 with the aim of addressing “possible challenges to space security and sustainability,”74 and a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) was
established to consider practical measures for the prevention of an arms race
in outer space and to “make recommendations on substantial elements of an

67
Id. at ¶¶ 6, 12 (“Finding a precise method to be used for determining, in an objective
way, what constitutes harmful interference does not seem a fairly easy thing to do.”)
68
This can be encapsulated under the concept of “space situational awareness” and corollary concept of space traffic management. See SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION, SPACE
SUSTAINABILITY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 16–17 (2018), swfound.org/media/206407/swf_spac
e_sustainability_booklet_2018_web.pdf.
69
Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines, supra note 11, at ¶ 49.
70
G.A. Res. 74/32, supra note 9.
71
U.N. Doc. CD/1839, supra note 61; see also G.A. Res. 74/34, No First Placement of
Weapons in Outer Space (2019).
72
See U.N. Secretary General, Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and
Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, U.N. Doc. A/68/189 (July 29,
2013). For the latest UNGA resolution, see G.A. Res.74/67, Transparency and ConfidenceBuilding Measures in Outer Space Activities (Dec. 12, 2019).
73
EU Proposal for an International Space Code of Conduct, Draft, EUROPEAN UNION
EXTERNAL ACTION (Mar. 31, 2014), www.eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmam
ent/pdf/space_code_conduct_draft_vers_31-march-2014_en.pdf.
74
Press Release, Gen. Assembly, As Fourth, First Committees Hold Joint Meeting,
Speakers Stress Need for Holistic Handling of Outer Space Security, Sustainability, U.N.
Press Release GA/DIS/3531 (Oct. 22, 2015); Press Release, Gen. Assembly, Raising
Alarm over Possible Space Wars, First Committee Delegates Explore Ways to Build New
Order for Preventing Celestial Conflict, Confrontation, U.N. Press Release GA/DIS/3609
(Oct. 24, 2018).
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international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in
outer space.”75
Sadly, none of these diplomatic and multilateral efforts proved effective or
lasting to divert away from the worrying trend of expanding space militarisation, possible space weaponization, and potential conflicts (wars) in space.
Indeed, at the latest UNCOPUOS meeting in 2019, the view was expressed
“that the absence of conflicts in space in the past could not be regarded as a
guarantee of peace, in particular in an era in which new actors were entering
the space arena.”76 Urgently needed are considerations of “ways and means
of maintaining outer space for peaceful purposes and its consideration of the
broader perspective of space security and associated matters that would be
instrumental in ensuring the safe and responsible conduct of space activities
. . . .”77
V. WAYS AND MEANS OF MAINTAINING OUTER SPACE FOR PEACEFUL
PURPOSES
The lack of diplomatic will, and at times inability, to address issues related
to space activities in general and matters of space security in particular, has
resulted in repeated calls to find “ways and means of maintaining outer space
for peaceful purposes” and addressing the broader issue of space security and
the “the safe and responsible conduct of space activities.”78 Such efforts have
been ongoing for at least two decades.79 Such efforts will invariably persist
due to various diplomatic efforts (outlined above) that have been tried and
tested without much avail.
Though perspectives on the substantive means and ways of maintaining
outer space for peaceful purposes differ,80 there is undeniable consensus that
the international legal framework established by the UN space law treaties
and resolutions must underpin all undertakings in the exploration and use of
space, irrespective of whether such activities are civilian in nature or have a
military or security bearing.81

75
G.A. Res. 72/250, ¶ 3 (Jan. 12, 2018). For the latest report, see U.N. Secretary-General, Group of Governmental Experts on Further Practical Measures for the Prevention of
an Arms Race in Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/74/77 (Apr. 9, 2019).
76
Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines, supra note 11, at ¶ 54.
77
Id. at ¶ 42.
78
Press Release, Fourth Committee, Using Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes Can Contribute to Implementation of Millennium Declaration, Chairman Says, As Fourth Committee Begins Debate, U.N. Press Release GA/SPD/321 (Oct. 17, 2005).
79
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 54/67, ¶ 29 (Feb. 11, 1999).
80
See generally Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its Sixty-Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/74/20 (2019).
81
ICPUOS, supra note 57, at ¶ 5.
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Presented below are two recent initiatives and, arguably, breakthroughs at
the international level that serve to produce instruments to ensure that the governance of outer space continues under the international rule of law and is
driven by the interests of all of humankind. One initiative is the top-down
diplomatic effort that resulted in the drafting and adoption of the UN Longterm Sustainability Guidelines by the UNCOPUOS; the second is the civil
society initiative in the drafting of the McGill Manual on International Law
Applicable to Military Uses of Outer Space.
VI. THE LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY GUIDELINES
Writing at the dawn of the Space Age, Myres S. McDougal and Leon Lipson noted that the mode of the regulation of space activities cannot be “be
charted with any precision.”82 Much of this is due to the very nature of the
domain, which unlike any other, is an arena where military and non-military
(civilian and commercial) interests and activities intercept and have always
been intertwined.
Even so, by and large the governance of outer space has gone through
phases that last approximately two decades,83 beginning with the multilateral
treaty process and adoption of the five UN space law treaties from the 1960s
to the 1980s, which was followed up with the advent of UN principles dealing
with specific technical applications of space from the 1980s to the 2000s.84
The 2000s to date have been marked by the adoption of General Assembly
resolutions and guidelines on matters such as TCBMs and the prevention of
an arms race in outer space outlined in the previous section. The latest phase
culminated with the rare and historic adoption of the Guidelines for the Longterm Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines).85

82
Myres S. McDougal & Leon Lipson, Perspectives for a Law of Outer Space, 52 AM.
J. INT’L L. 407, 430 (1958).
83
This was highlighted by Mr. Niklas Hedman, Chief Policy & Legal Affairs section of
the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, at the APSCO TUBITAK UZAY Space
Law Training Course, 18–21 September 2019, Istanbul, Turkey. Niklas Hedman, Chief
Policy & Legal Affairs, United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Lecture at the
APSCO TUBITAK UZAY Space Law Training Course, in Istanbul, Turkey (Sept. 2019).
84
See G.A. Res. 37/92, supra note 25; G.A. Res. 41/65, supra note 25; G.A. Res. 47/68,
supra note 25; G.A. Res. 62/101 (Dec. 17, 2007); Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its Sixty-Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/62/20
(2007); G.A. Res. 68/74 (Dec. 11, 2013).
85
Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines, supra note 11, at 50.
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The Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines were adopted by consensus as a
result of close to a decade of intense discussions86 on a set of voluntary guidelines for space actors to ensure space:
remain[s] an operationally stable and safe environment that is
maintained for peaceful purposes and open for exploration, use
and international cooperation by current and future generations, in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree
of economic or scientific development, without discrimination
of any kind and with due regard for the principle of equity.87
The Guidelines have been hailed as a breakthrough in international transparency and norm-building. For the first time since the adoption of the Moon
Agreement four decades ago, there is now a compendium of internationally
agreed measures and practices to ensure the long-term sustainability of space
activities and to enhance the safety of space operations. Integral to the Guidelines is fulfilling the objectives of the Declaration of Legal Principles and
Outer Space Treaty to ensure that outer space can be explored and used by
current and future generations for peaceful purposes and in the interest of all
humankind.88 Underpinning the Guidelines is the consensus that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies,
remains “the province of all (hu)mankind,”89 and that activities of States in
outer space be carried out in accordance with international law, including the
Charter of the United Nations, thus affirming the principles contained in Article III of the Outer Space Treaty. 90
The Guidelines address a number of policy, regulatory, operational, technical and capacity-building aspects of space activities,91 and apply to ongoing
or planned activities conducted by States, international organizations or nongovernmental entities.92 The Guidelines are drafted in way that make them
relevant “to all phases of a space mission, including launch, operation and
end-of-life disposal.”93
To date, there have been twenty-one guidelines adopted on, among other
matter, enhancing the national regulation and supervision of national space
86

See generally Peter Martinez, Development of an International Compendium of
Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, 43 SPACE POL’Y 13
(2018).
87
Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines, supra note 11, at 50 ¶ 4.
88
Id. at 50–51 ¶ 5.
89
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16, at art. I; Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines,
supra note 11, at 51 ¶ 8.
90
Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines, supra note 11, at 51 ¶ 7.
91
Id. at 51 ¶ 11.
92
Id.
93
Id.
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activities,94 improving the timely practice of registration,95 and enhancing the
safety of space operations,96 especially information exchange on space objects
and events.97 There are further guidelines on enhancing the sharing of space
debris monitoring information,98 sharing space weather data and forecasts and
developing space weather models,99 and for promoting and supporting information exchange and capacity-building.100 Seven guidelines, pertaining to
more politically sensitive and divisive issues, such as the commitment to conducting space activities solely “for peaceful purposes”101 and measures to
identify and mitigate risks to terrestrial infrastructure that support space operations,102 are to be discussed further with the aim of reaching international
consensus in the years to come.
While laudable, the Guidelines are exactly as the name suggests: guidelines that are to be implemented “to the greatest extent feasible and practicable” and according to the “respective needs, conditions and capabilities” of
the states or international organizations concerned.103 Thus, the Guidelines are
“voluntary and not legally binding under international law.”104 Further, it is
expressly stated that the Guidelines do not “constitute a revision, qualification
or reinterpretation of [applicable international law] principles and norms,”105
which may undermine their status and value.
However, it must be recognized that even if states and international organizations voluntarily implement or refer to the Guidelines, the international
community may see greater convergence of practices and the adoption of regulations and policies in line with the Guidelines. Such convergent practices,
and the adoption of regulations and policies that are inspired by the Guidelines, may support the emergence of general practice that is “sufficiently widespread and representative, as well as consistent.”106 Such general practice

94

Id. at § II (A)(1)–(3), at 54–56.
Id. at § II (A)(5), at 57–59.
96
Id. at § II (B), at 59–66.
97
Id. at § II (B)(2)–(5), at 60–62.
98
Id. at § II (B)(3), at 60; see also id. § II (B)(8), at 64.
99
Id. § II (B)(6)–(7), at 62–64.
100
Id. § II (C)(1)–(4), at 66–68.
101
Survey of the Problem of Discretion, supra note 45, at ¶ 7.
102
Id. at 4, §§ 18–19.
103
Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines, supra note 11, at ¶ 16.
104
Id. at ¶ 15.
105
Id.
106
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/71/10,
at 77 (2016).
95
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need not be “absolutely rigorous,”107 and may go a long way to creating practice that may eventually be valuable in the identification of custom.108
VII. THE MILAMOS PROJECT
As alluded to earlier, though space activities must be conducted in accordance with the international rule of law, obviously not all international law
would apply to space activities.109 As Lachs noted, many domains of international law would acquire a “new dimension” in regulating the conduct of states
in outer space and would therefore warrant “a more extensive interpretation.”110 Again, the Russian Federation described the problem succinctly and
underlined that “analysis or characterization by a State of another State’s behaviour most often does not reflect the manner in which that State judges its
own behaviour of essentially the same kind. Such double standards may result
in a situation where events develop according to a threatening scenario.”111
Thus, there is a need to objectively clarify the rules of international law applicable to military space activities conducted during peacetime, including in
times posing challenges to peace.112
The implications of certain activities that interfere with the rights of other
States may lead to internationally wrongful acts and warrant different responses that,113 in order to ensure sustainable, responsible and peaceful use of

107

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. V. U.S.), Judgement, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 186 (June 27).
108
For more on the elements of custom, see Ram Jakhu et al., The Sources of International Space Law: Revisited, 67 J. AIR & SPACE L. 606, 623 (2018). As Daniel Thurer
describes it, soft law instruments, such as the Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines, represent “a complex of norms lacking binding force, but producing significant legal effects
nevertheless.” Daniel Thurer, Soft Law, ¶ 37, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009); see also Steven Freeland, The Role of ‘Soft Law’ in Public
International Law and Its Relevance to the International Legal Regulation of Outer Space,
in SOFT LAW IN OUTER SPACE: THE FUNCTION OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL
SPACE LAW 9–30 (2012); Jean-Francois Mayence, The European Union’s Initiative for a
code of Conduct on Space Activities: A Model of Soft Law for Outer Space?, in SOFT LAW
IN OUTER SPACE: THE FUNCTION OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW
343 (2012).
109
There may be some rules that do not apply, such as lex specialis rules that govern
“specific environments.” See LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, supra note 13, at 13.
110
Id. at 14.
111
Survey of the Problem of Discretion, supra note 45, at ¶ 15.
112
The vision of the MILAMOS Project is to “develop, within a period of three years, a
manual that objectively articulates and clarifies existing international law applicable to
military uses of outer space in time of peace, including challenges to peace.” See Manual
on International Law Applicable to Military Uses of Outer Space, MCGILL, https://www.m
cgill.ca/milamos/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2020).
113
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, pt. 2, U.N. Doc. A/56/10
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outer space, may well differ according to the circumstances and the severity
of the interference. The maintenance of international peace and security, on
Earth as well as in space, must distinguish between what the International
Court of Justice held in Nicaragua are “the most grave forms of the use of
force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms.”114
The Articles on State Responsibility, codified by the International Law
Commission and adopted by the U.N. General Assembly,115 confirm that the
international legal regime is governed by a framework to adjudge the responsibility of States for wrongful acts116 and describe circumstances when wrongfulness can be precluded,117 such as in the event of necessity118 or self-defence.119 Countermeasures may be taken, also in the space context, as long as
it is in accordance with international law and the UN Charter to refrain from
the threat or use of force,120 and so far as the countermeasure is commensurate
to the injury suffered and subject to other conditions considering the gravity
of the triggering wrongful act and rights affected.121
By capturing the applicable customary law in black-letter rules and providing evidence of State practice and opinio juris to support the existence of such
customary norms, manuals have historically proven useful to reach international consensus on the legality of activities in domains on which “an international treaty, which might perhaps be premature or at least very difficult to
obtain.”122 The space domain, particularly in relation to discussing and reaching consensus on the rules surrounding military space activities and activities
that have implications for space security, is a realm of regulation that is wellsuited for the manual process.

(2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 32, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility].
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Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 191 (June 27); see also Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v.
U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 64 (Nov 6).
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G.A. Res. 56/83, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Jan. 28,
2002).
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An international, wrongful act must be: i) attributable to the State under international
law; and ii) constitute the breach of an international obligation of the State. See Articles on
State Responsibility, supra note 113, at art. 2.
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See id.
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Id. at art. 25.
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Id. at art. 21.
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UN Charter art. 2, ¶ 4; see also Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 113, at art.
50(1)(a).
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See generally Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 113, at ch. II; see also Survey of the Problem of Discretion, supra note 45, at ¶ 10.
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THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS,
AND OTHER DOCUMENTS, Preface (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 1988).
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The contribution and value of manuals have moreover been affirmed on
occasions by international courts and tribunals,123 with the International Criminal Court deeming manuals as “provid[ing] the most useful guidance on the
applicable law,” and as providing the “useful expression of the crystallisation”
of the law.124 There have been various non-governmental efforts to objectively
clarify the application of the law in the other frontiers. The process and success of the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflict at Sea,125 the Harvard Manual on International Law Applicable to Air
and Missile Warfare,126 and the Tallinn Manual on International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare127 demonstrate how international experts and engagement with governments can produce non-official interpretation and clarification of the law while avoiding many of the challenges inherent in multilateral
negotiations among states. Though these manuals deal with the application of
the law of armed conflict or warfare in particular domains, it must be underlined that “manuals today do not limit their coverage just to the law of armed
conflict.”128
The McGill Manual is the first of its kind to address the legality of a range
of issues that have a bearing on military activities in outer space. Doing so
will contribute to the progressive development of international law and foster
international peace and security and the sustainability of outer space, which is
in the interest of all States, and is indeed a goal of all humanity.
Launched in May 2016, and having gathered the involvement of dozens of
legal and technical subject-matter experts from institutions across the
globe,129 the MILAMOS Project crucially defines the legality and scope of
responsible behavior in situations that fall short of armed conflict. The
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Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-l, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 99 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995);
U.N. Panel of Inquiry on the Gaza Flotilla Incident of May 31, 2010, Rep. of the SecretaryGeneral’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident, ¶ 157 (Sept. 2011).
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SEA (Louise Doswald Beck ed., 1994).
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HARVARD MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE
(2009), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/8B2E79FC145BFB3D4925
76E00021ED34-HPCR-may2009.pdf.
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NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (2013).
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Earle A. Partington, Manuals on the Law of Armed Conflict, ¶ 10, in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2016); see, e.g., LEUVEN MANUAL ON THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO PEACE OPERATIONS (Terry D. Gill et al. eds., 2017).
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Our People, MCGILL UNIV., www.mcgill.ca/milamos/our-people (last visited Mar.
30, 2020).
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MILAMOS Project also explains the legal consequences that exist for states
that breach their international obligations toward other states and the international community as a whole. Such a manual is essential in clarifying how
international legal principles and norms such as interference, intervention, and
the threat or use of force apply in outer space or to space activities, so as to
avoid unilateral interpretations of the law and reduce the risk of “misperception, misinformation, misunderstanding and miscalculation arising from military activities in outer space.”130 Such clear statements and interpretations of
the law by neutral experts will be crucial to ensure that all space activities,
conducted by a State or space operator, are conducted in accordance with fundamental tenets of international law.
Acknowledgement by States and international experts in the legal domain
of these fundamental concepts amount to a significant transparency and confidence-building measure, which would in turn help to reduce the likelihood
of conflict in space. The successful completion of a manual with the input of
eminent authors, experts and recognized stakeholders in space activities will
provide states and space operators with clear statements and objective interpretations of the law as it is (lex lata).
To date, the MILAMOS Project has gathered international renown and has
been presented at various venues across the globe. More recently, in June
2018, at the symposium organized to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the first
United Nations Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(UNISPACE+50), the MILAMOS Project was highlighted as a prime example of the role that civil society institutions can play to bring together various
actors and stakeholders involved in the exploration and use of outer space and
foster dialogue and consensus on challenging issues pertaining to space
law.131 Reflecting the remarkable standing of the MILAMOS Project, in October 2018 the rule-drafting and consensus-forming process, the latest developments, and progress surrounding the work of the Manual were presented to
the delegates of the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly
and of the United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(UNCOPUOS).132 In September 2019, the MILAMOS Project was presented
at the Second United Nations Conference on Space Law and Policy as a viable
means to strengthen the long-term use and sustainability of outer space.133
130

Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines, supra note 11, at ¶ 49.
MILAMOS Project Presented at UNISPACE+50, MCGILL UNIV. (June 18, 2018), ww
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132
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Committee, MCGILL UNIV., www.mcgill.ca/milamos/news-and-updates#UNGA (last visited Mar. 30, 2020).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
At the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty in 1967, then-U.S. President
Lyndon Johnson famously declared that “[n]o one may use outer space or celestial bodies to begin a war.”134 Noting the “successful identification of common interests and their expression in a mutually acceptable legal instrument”135 that was concluded in “remarkably short time,”136 then-Secretary of
State Dean Rusk underlined the Treaty’s success “in substantial measure in
establishing the necessary standards for reducing the dangers of military conflict in outer space” and the necessity of cooperation if “the world is going to
escape destruction by conflict.”137 These words ring true over half a century
since the adoption of the single most crucial international instrument that has
prevented conflict in space.
As one person succinctly highlighted at the UNCOPUOS, the “absence of
conflicts in space in the past could not be regarded as a guarantee of peace.”138
Though military and strategic interests have been integral to the exploration
and use of outer space from the very beginning, the ICRC has unequivocally
stated that as with any new means or methods of warfare, “the weaponization
of outer space is not inevitable but is a choice” that would increase the probability of armed conflict in outer space.139 Due to the devastating consequences and humanitarian implications of an armed conflict in space, all states
that are reliant on the space infrastructure must avoid further weaponization
and trends that increase the likelihood of conflict. Indeed, the choice to fight
a war in space is one that even the United States,140 and all other States, do
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In light of the inability to reach binding international agreement to secure
space security and set ground rules for the military uses of outer space, the
UN Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines and the MILAMOS Project presented in this Article are innovative and viable ways and means which will go
a long way to strengthen the responsible and peaceful use of outer space.

